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Abstract
Plant virus infectious clones are important tools with wide-ranging applications in different areas
of biology and medicine. Their uses in plant pathology include the study of plant–virus
interactions, and screening of germplasm as part of prebreeding programmes for virus
resistance. They can also be modified to induce transient plant gene silencing (Virus Induced
Gene Silencing – VIGS) and as expression vectors for plant or exogenous proteins, with
applications in both plant pathology and more generally for the study of plant gene function.
Plant viruses are also increasingly being investigated as expression vectors for in planta
production of pharmaceutical products, known as molecular farming. However, plant virus
infectious clones may pose a risk to the environment due to their ability to reconstitute fully
functional, transmissible viruses. These risks arise from both their inherent pathogenicity and the
effect of any introduced genetic modifications. Effective containment measures are therefore
required. There has been no single comprehensive review of the biosafety considerations for the
contained use of genetically modified plant viruses, despite their increasing importance across
many biological fields. This review therefore explores the biosafety considerations for working
with genetically modified plant viruses in contained environments, with focus on plant growth
facilities. It includes regulatory frameworks, risk assessment, assignment of biosafety levels,
facility features and working practices. The review is based on international guidance together
with information provided by plant virus researchers.
Introduction
Plant viruses are important not only because of the threat they
pose to global crop production, but also due to their use as
research tools in molecular plant pathology and other areas of
biotechnology (Rybicki, 2015; Scholthof et al., 2011). Much of
this success hinges on the ability to maintain, replicate and modify
plant viral genomes in the form of infectious clones (ICs).
Infectious clones consist of plant viral genome material
maintained as cDNA or DNA templates within bacterial plasmids,
usually in Escherichia coli, affording ease of in vitro propagation,
storage and genetic manipulation. These plasmids can then be
used for in vitro transcription of viral RNA for direct inoculation of
plants (for RNA viruses) or transformed into Agrobacterium
tumefaciens for inoculation of plants by agroinfiltration (both
RNA and DNA viruses) (Dagless et al., 1997; Feng et al., 2016;
Peyret and Lomonossoff, 2015; Zarzynska-Nowak et al., 2017).
This then results in infection and the reconstitution of fully
functional self-replicating virus genomes within the plant host.
Plant virus ICs have a broad range of applications. Within the
field of plant pathology, the creation of infectious clones
containing wild-type viral genomes provides a ready source of
inoculum for disease resistance screening of different host
genotypes. This negates the need to maintain and passage the
virus within plants and provides an alternative to laborious or
inefficient inoculation techniques such as grafting or infection by
insect vectors. ICs also provide a genetically uniform source of
inoculum, removing obstacles caused by genetically variable viral
populations or mutations occurring during plant passage.
Examples include the use of Cassava mosaic virus ICs to screen
transgenic cassava for virus resistance, aiding the development of
cassava lines with resistance to the devastating diseases caused by
these viruses (Beyene et al., 2016; Kuria et al., 2017). In addition,
infectious clones can also be used to study the host response at a
molecular level. For example, Tomato chlorotic mottle virus
infectious clones were used to compare the proteomes of
resistant and susceptible near-isogenic tomato lines following
infection (Carmo et al., 2017).
The use of infectious clones allows for modification of the viral
genome prior to inoculation, with various applications. For
example, Martin and Rybicki (2002) identified the pathogenicity
determinants of a highly pathogenic maize streak virus strain by
systematically ‘swapping out’ sections of its genome with those
from less pathogenic strains, creating chimaeric infectious clones.
Duff-Farrier et al. (2015, 2016) used chimaeric infectious clones
of Pepino mosaic virus to identify the pathogenicity determinants
of different virus strains within various plant hosts. Similarly,
Harper et al. (2016) identified the genetic determinants of Citrus
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tristeza virus transmissibility by aphids by systematically substitut-
ing sequences from a highly transmissible strain into a poorly
transmissible strain.
Chimaeric ICs have also been used to study the constraints of
plant virus recombination in an evolutionary context (Martin
et al., 2005). Tagging of plant viral genomes with fluorescent
reporter genes is also widely used both to track viral movement in
planta and to elucidate the function of specific viral proteins. For
example, Martinez and Daros (2014) used fluorescent tagging of
the Tobacco etch virus P1 protein to track its subcellular
localization and interaction with host proteins.
In addition to their role in the study of plant–virus interactions,
modified plant viruses can also be used to trigger silencing of
host genes (known as virus induced gene silencing or VIGS)
without the need for stable plant transgenesis (Lange et al.,
2013; Lee et al., 2012). VIGS involves modifying infectious clones
to contain a short sequence of the host gene of interest,
resulting in post-transcriptional silencing of the gene as part of
the plant’s own defence response following virus infection. For
example, modified Barley stripe mosaic virus is widely used to
silence genes in polyploid cereals such as wheat. Beyond
silencing plant genes, VIGS can also be used to silence the
genes of other plant pathogens during co-infection, further
aiding the study of plant–pathogen interactions and exploring
gene function in pathogens not amenable to modification
(reviewed in Lee et al., 2012).
However, the use of ICs is no longer the preserve of plant
molecular biologists and pathologists. Modified plant viruses are
also increasingly being used in other disciplines as expression
vectors for heterologous proteins, particularly with biopharma-
ceutical and industrial applications (known as molecular farm-
ing). Such applications have been extensively reviewed
elsewhere (Canizares et al., 2005; Daniell et al., 2009; Gleba
et al., 2007; Hefferon, 2012, 2014; Marsian and Lomonossoff,
2016; Nagyova and Subr, 2007; Plchova et al., 2017; Pogue
et al., 2002; Saunders and Lomonossoff, 2013; Steele et al.,
2017).
Briefly, plants can be used as living ‘factories’ for foreign
protein production and these systems are less costly than other
eukaryotic bioreactors. The use of ICs to transiently express the
gene of interest in planta is often favoured over stable transge-
nesis, due to the ease and speed with which viral genomes can be
modified compared to those of plants, the high levels of protein
production achieved and the potential for use in a broad range of
hosts. Such systems show promise for the generation of vaccines,
antigens, hormones, therapeutic antibodies, industrial biopoly-
mers and bio-nanoparticles.
There has been no single comprehensive review of the
biosafety considerations for the contained use of genetically
modified plant viruses, despite their increasing importance across
many biological fields. This review therefore explores the
biosafety considerations for working with IC-derived plant viruses
in contained environments, with focus on plant growth facilities.
It includes regulatory frameworks, risk assessment, assignment of
biosafety levels, facility features and working practices. The
review is based on international guidance together with infor-
mation provided by plant virus researchers.
Biosafety and plant virus ICs
Plant virus ICs are powerful tools with applications across multiple
scientific fields from plant pathology to biopharmaceutical
production. However, their use carries potential environmental
risks and is therefore subject to containment and regulation.
Once inside a plant cell, the viral genome is translated or
released, leading to reconstitution of a fully functional virus that
is then capable of replication and potentially of spread within
the plant and transmission to other plants. In addition, while
unmodified plant viruses do not pose a risk to human health
(Nikitin et al., 2016), they could potentially be used as
expression vectors for genes encoding proteins known to have
some degree of human allergenicity or toxicity, with potential
health implications for researchers and the wider population
(NIH 2013; Wagner et al., 2004). Despite this, there is no single
source of guidance tailored specifically towards effective con-
tainment of genetically modified plant viruses. The relevant
information is scattered across numerous documents from
multiple countries and therefore not easily accessible to
researchers. In this review, we therefore consolidate this
information to highlight the biosafety considerations for the
contained use of plant viruses. We also review individual risk
assessments and protocols provided by researchers currently
working with plant virus ICs in Europe and the United States.
We focus predominantly on mitigation of environmental risks
from the use of ICs in plant growth facilities. We also highlight
complexities in the regulatory and approval process for working
with plant virus infectious clones, using the UK framework as
an example.
Risk groups and biosafety levels
The World Health Organization Laboratory Biosafety Manual
(WHO 2004) provides international guidance for working with
disease-causing and/or genetically modified microorganisms. It
sets out four risk groups for these microorganisms based on the
likelihood and impact of release or exposure, ranging from 1
being low to 4 the highest risk. It then sets out four correspond-
ing laboratory biosafety levels (BSLs), each with defined require-
ments for laboratory design and operating procedures (WHO
2004). This guidance has been adopted globally and translated
into broadly comparable national regulations and guidance (Tian
and Zheng, 2014).
However, the WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual is largely
focussed on containment of pathogens of humans and animals in
a laboratory setting and not the environmental risks posed by
contained use of genetically modified plants or plant pathogens.
There is no equivalent international level guidance for plant
containment facilities.
Many countries are signed up to international treaties related
to plant biosafety, namely the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol
(https://bch.cbd.int/protocol) and the International Plant Protec-
tion Convention (https://www.ippc.int). However, the former is
primarily concerned with the deliberate release of genetically
modified plants, while the latter aims to control the spread of
plant pests and pathogens already present in nature. Neither
currently sets out guidance on contained use.
It has therefore fallen to individual countries to build upon the
WHO laboratory guidelines, to create guidance applicable to the
contained use of plants and plant pathogens (including plant virus
ICs) within plant growth facilities, with consideration for the
environmental risks posed. This has resulted in the creation of
country-specific but broadly comparable guidance for the con-
tainment of GM plants and plant pathogens, including the
adoption of biosafety levels specific to plants.
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Biosafety levels for plants
The United States was the first country to build upon the
laboratory biosafety levels set out by WHO to set out four
biosafety levels for plants (BLPs) as described in the USA National
Institutes of Health biosafety guidelines (NIH 2013). These are
summarized below:
• BLP1: Designed for containment of experiments that pose no
recognizable or predictable risk to the environment in the
event of accidental release.
• BLP2: Appropriate for experiments where there is a possibility
of survival and dissemination of plant-related material in the
event of accidental release, but where this would have a
minimal biological impact.
• BLP3: Designed to minimize or prevent spread or release of
organisms that have the potential for significant environmental
harm. It is also appropriate for containment of plants or
associated microbes producing vertebrate toxins.
• BLP4: The highest containment level may be required for
containment of certain exotic plant pathogens, including
viruses in the presence of their arthropod vector.
The NIH (USA) also describes biological containment methods
(such as removal of flowering plant parts) which can be used to
reduce the biosafety level requirement in some instances. Further
examples of biological containment of plant virus ICs are
described under ‘Biological Containment’ later in this review.
The NIH guidelines are expanded upon in ‘A practical guide to
containment: Plant biosafety in research greenhouses’ (Adair and
Irwin, 2008). The first edition of this manual (Traynor et al., 2001)
along with the NIH guidelines has been used as a reference point
for several other countries when developing their own guidance
or legislation for plant containment (Department of Agriculture
(South Africa), 2004; UNCST, 2007; Adair and Irwin, 2008;
Replublic of Kenya, 2009; Tanzania, 2012; Australian Govern-
ment, 2012). This has resulted in broadly comparable guidelines
and plant biosafety level designations across the globe, with
countries such as South Africa adopting the USA BLP designations
ad verbum (Department of Agriculture, South Africa, 2004).
An equivalent framework of plant biosafety levels has also
been adopted across the European Union, enacted in EU directive
2009/41/EC. As such, the Health and Safety Executive in the
United Kingdom also sets out four biosafety levels (BSLs) for plant
growth facilities (HSE, 2004). However, unlike the NIH, the UK
HSE does not state the purpose of each BSL in summary form.
Rather, assignment of the BSL for an activity involving plant-
associated genetically modified microorganisms (GMMs) is based
on a detailed risk assessment (see ‘Risk Assessment’ below).
BSL4 is not represented in the UK guidance as no such plant
growth facility currently exists in the United Kingdom. BSL1 is only
suitable for activities with ‘no or negligible risk’; therefore, in planta
work involving plant virus ICs is likely to be carried out at BSL2 or
BSL3. The building, equipment and operational requirements for
these BSLs are summarized in Table 1, with differences in require-
ments betweenBSLs highlighted. ThekeydifferencesbetweenBSL2
and BSL3 are the requirement for negative pressure and air filtering,
sealed flooring and waste treatment within the facility at BSL3.
Some countries such as Canada have slightly different mini-
mum requirements and numbering systems for each biosafety
level; Canadian Plant Pest Containment (PPC) levels 1-3 roughly
correspond to UK-BSL/USA-BLP2-4 (Canadian Food Inspection
Agency 2014).
Risk assessment
A risk assessment is necessary for activities involving pathogenic
microorganisms, including plant viruses. The aim of the assess-
ment is to identify and define risks posed to the environment and
to human health and identify control measures required to
mitigate these risks. Some national competent authorities provide
step-by-step guidance on performing risk assessments for work-
ing with plant-associated GMMs. For example, in the United
Kingdom, the HSE require the use of a risk determination matrix,
which considers the likelihood of release against the conse-
quences should a release occur (Table 2). The risk is considered
high when there is a high likelihood of release along with severe
consequences in the event of a release. Conversely, if both the
likelihood and consequences of a release are negligible, then the
risk can be considered as effectively zero (HSE, 2004). Contain-
ment measures must be selected that reduce the overall risk to
low or effectively zero. Other countries such as Canada also use
risk determination matrices to inform decisions regarding the
biosafety measures required. Canada’s matrix is based on the risk
of escape and establishment in the absence of physical contain-
ment and assigns a required biosafety level accordingly. However,
the physical attributes of the facility must be adequate for
containment regardless of risk posed (Canadian Food Inspection
Agency 2014).
A risk assessment needs to consider many factors, such as
whether the virus is indigenous, its host range, effects of genetic
modification, the presence of hosts or vectors and interactions
with other organisms within or around the containment facility. In
addition to the nature of the virus, the nature of the activity
should also be considered, such as experiment duration and scale
(HSE, 2004; Department of Agriculture (South Africa), 2004;
Adair and Irwin, 2008; Canadian Food Inspection Agency 2014).
The following sections highlight key considerations for plant virus
risk assessments:
Effects of genetic modification
In the case of genetically modified plant virus ICs, the risk
assessment needs to consider not only the inherent risks of the
virus but also how the risks might be altered by its modification
(Department of Agriculture (South Africa) 2004; Phillipson and
Weekes, 2005; HSE, 2004). For example, an otherwise low-risk
virus modified to express a fungal virulence factor may pose and
environmental risk by making infected plants more susceptible to
fungal pathogens. Similarly, a virus carrying a construct to silence
a trait involved in crop yield would present a higher risk to nearby
host crops than the unmodified virus (Lee et al., 2012). Genetic
modifications may also impact the host range, survival and
transmission of the virus or result in loss of host resistance. For
example, introduction of a coat protein mutation in Pepino
mosaic virus breaks Rx-mediated resistance in solanaceous hosts
(Duff-Farrier et al., 2016) and so would be a higher risk than ICs
that were not able to overcome such host resistance.
Interactions with other organisms
There may be additional risks posed by other organisms contained
in close proximity to the plant virus or indeed be part of the same
experimental system (Adair and Irwin, 2008). These include GM
or exotic plants, insect vectors and other infectious agents such as
Agrobacterium tumefaciens that may have been used to intro-
duce the viral genome into the host plant. Consideration should
be given not only to the inherent risks of these organisms but also
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to the potential interaction between them and the infectious
clone, aiding dissemination and transmission. Plant growth
facilities are often used by multiple researchers for various
projects, which may have different containment requirements,
and operational practices need to reflect this.
Establishment in the environment
Risks of establishment and survival of a plant virus depend not
only on the virus and any modifications, but also on the
immediate environment. Viruses are unlikely to persist in an
Table 2 Risk determination matrix for assessing the level of risk posed by a contained use activity involving GM plant viruses, modified from the
UK SACGM Compendium of Guidance Part 4 (HSE, 2004). The biosafety level and containment measures selected for the activity must be
sufficient to reduce the risk to low or effectively zero
Likelihood of Hazard
High Medium Low Negligible
Consequence of Hazard Severe High High Medium Effectively Zero
Modest High Medium Medium/Low Effectively zero
Minor Medium/low Low Low Effectively Zero
Negligible Effectively Zero Effectively Zero Effectively Zero Effectively Zero
Table 1 Requirements for plant growth facilities operating at Biosafety (Containment) levels 2 and 3. Y – Required. N – Not required. Y/N –
Required where and to the extent that the risk assessment shows it is required. Differences between containment levels 2 and 3 are highlighted in
yellow. Modified from the UK SACGM Compendium of Guidance Part 4 (HSE 2004)
Containment measures Containment Level 2 Containment level 3
Building
Permanent structure Y Y
Laboratory suite: isolation N Y
Laboratory: sealable for fumigation N Y
Equipment
Impervious, easy to clean surfaces Y – bench Y – bench and floor
Entry via an airlock or a separate room with two interlocking doors Y/N Y/N
Negative pressure relative to immediate surroundings Y/N Y
HEPA filtered extract air N Y
Microbiological safety cabinet/enclosure Y/N Y
Autoclave Y – in building Y – in laboratory suite
Control of contaminated run-off water Y – to minimize run-off Y– to prevent run-off
System of Work
Restricted Access Y Y
Specific measures to control aerosol dissemination Y – to minimize Y – to prevent
Shower N Y/N
Protective clothing Y Y
Protective footwear N Y/N
Gloves Y/N Y
Effective control of disease vectors which could disseminate the GMM Y Y
Effective control of plant material which could disseminate the GMM Y – to minimize dissemination Y – to prevent dissemination
Procedures for transfer of living material between facilities shall
control dissemination of GMMs
Y – to minimize dissemination Y – to prevent dissemination
Specified disinfection procedures Y Y
Waste
Inactivation of GMMs in effluent from hand-washing sinks and
showers and similar effluents
N Y/N
Inactivation of GMMs in contaminated materials and waste Y – by validated means Y – by validated means, with
waste inactivated in the
laboratory suite
Laboratory to contain its own equipment N Y – so far as is reasonably practicable
An observation window or alternative is to be present so that
occupants can be seen
Y/N Y
Safe storage of GMMs Y Y
Written records of staff training Y/N Y
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environment where their host and/or vector are absent. The risk
may also be considered lower in countries where the plant host is
present but not economically important or widely cultivated.
Therefore, ICs that pose a prohibitively high risk in one country or
region may be used with relatively low risk in another. However,
the possibility of unknown hosts or vectors that would allow
survival and establishment should always be carefully considered,
as should the ability of the virus to adapt to infect new hosts or
vectors.
Consideration of socioeconomic factors
When assessing the impact of virus escape and establishment, it is
important not only to consider the impact on host plants, such as
crops, but also the capacity of a country to identify, respond to
and mitigate a containment breach. In the case of crops, the
potential downstream impact on farmer livelihood must be
estimated. More economically developed countries with greater
food security might be less impacted by a disease outbreak than
less economically developed countries with a small number of
staple subsistence crops, diseases of which could result in loss of
livelihood and even famine (Thresh and Hillocks, 2003). These
countries may also be less well equipped to contain disease
spread, exacerbated by mixed cropping systems and year-round
availability of hosts.
Derogations from BSL requirements
It is important to identify the most appropriate measures for virus
containment on a case by case basis and then assign the
minimum Biosafety Level (BSL) that ensures these measures are
implemented, rather than simply applying generic containment
measures based on BSL, which may not be appropriate for
containment (HSE, 2004). The risk assessment may therefore
identify extra containment measures which are not specified for a
given BSL, but also cases where some features of the designated
BSL are not appropriate or beneficial for containment. This may
be because they are superfluous to requirements, or indeed
because they actively impede containment measures. In this
situation, the researchers may apply for derogations from the BSL.
A common derogation is the lack of microbiological safety
cabinets at BSL3, as these are inappropriate for in planta work.
Other examples may be specific to plant virus work; for example,
the negative pressure gradient normally required at BSL3 could
promote the ingress of insect vectors which could spread the virus
throughout the facility. HEPA filters, for example, are required at
BSL3; however, the use of a G4 filter may be more appropriate for
containing pollen-borne viruses (Adair and Irwin, 2008).
Common shortcomings of risk assessments for
genetically modified plant viruses
Research commissioned by HSE (UK) into the containment of
genetically modified plant viruses has identified several common
shortcomings and inconsistencies in the risk assessment process
(Phillipson and Weekes, 2005). The UK Scientific Advisory
Committee on Genetic Modification (SACGM) compendium of
guidance also provides an example risk assessment for working
with GM plant viruses, highlighting some of the details that
researchers may fail to include when performing a risk assessment
(HSE, 2004). Common shortcomings include the reliance on
expert opinion rather than empirical data, as well as specific risk
factors being described qualitatively rather than quantitatively.
This is particularly true of the assessment of risks related to the
stability of genetic modifications, the presence of hosts and/or
vectors and the potential for spread of mechanically transmitted
viruses as outlined below:
Stability of genetic modification
Researchers often state that, should a modified plant virus IC be
released, the nature of virus replication means that the genetic
insertion is likely to be lost after a number of rounds of
replication, rendering the virus equivalent to wild type, as
observed for the frequently used TMV expression system (Donson
et al., 1991; Kohl et al., 2006; Rabindran and Dawson, 2001;
Varsani et al., 2006). This argument is used to qualify the low
risks posed by multiple species of genetically modified indigenous
viruses. However, the likelihood of the insert persisting will
depend on the virus in question and the size and nature of the
insert, and so should be quantified on a case by case basis
(Hefferon, 2014; Phillipson and Weekes, 2005).
Conversely, and particularly in the case of molecular farming,
researchers use genetic modification to ‘disable’ viruses carrying
exogenous proteins, for example by removing genes required for
dissemination or transmission (Gleba et al., 2007; Hefferon,
2014). Their evaluation of risk relies on the assumption that this
modification is stable and would persist should the infectious
clone be released into the environment, without acknowledging
that the virus could be rendered fully infective via viral recom-
bination, whilst maintaining the genes for exogenous protein
production (Phillipson and Weekes, 2005).
Identification of hosts and vectors
The absence of native hosts or vectors in the environment
surrounding the containment facility is often used as a basis for
low risk, especially in the case of nonindigenous viruses. However,
lack of evidence of a known vector in the region where work is to
be done using a nonindigenous virus does not mean that no
vector exists. This also applies to host range, as there may be
unidentified hosts present in the local environment. Where
possible preliminary transmission studies should be done to
ascertain risk of transmission by native insect pests and/or to
native plant hosts (e.g. see Phillipson and Weekes, 2005).
Mechanical transmission
Mechanically transmitted viruses may be inadvertently spread
throughout a containment facility by physical contact between
plants, or contact between plants and contaminated equipment
such as watering cans or gloves. Equivalent risk of accidental
spread between plants is often apportioned to multiple species of
mechanically transferred viruses, without quantification of the
rates of transfer. However, Phillipson and Weekes (2005) found
significantly different rates of mechanical transmission between
two commonly used plant viruses: Tobacco mosaic virus and
Potato Virus X. It cannot be assumed that all mechanically
transmitted viruses have an equivalent risk of accidental spread.
It is therefore important that where possible, risk assessments
are based on established evidence and that a precautionary
approach is adopted where there is an element of uncertainty.
Dual use and deliberate release
In addition to the risks posed by unintentional release of a plant
virus from a containment facility, it is also important to consider
the potential for deliberate release or malicious use of plant virus
infectious clones, known as dual-use risk. While biological
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warfare is generally associated with human disease agents such
as anthrax, there is the potential for bioterrorism using plant
pathogens, which could have devastating effects on food
security. It has been proposed that targeting crops may be
simpler and less technologically challenging than biological
warfare against humans (Madden and Van Den Bosch, 2002;
Wheelis et al., 2002; Whitby, 2001). The USA Centers for Disease
Control (CDC) maintain a list of ‘select agents’ that are
considered a bioterrorism risk and require additional containment
and regulation. This list includes some plant pathogens but does
not currently include any plant viruses. However, there is concern
that molecular farming using modified plant viruses has the
potential for dual use due to the ability to produce large
quantities of human toxins in planta (Federation of American
Scientists 2011). In the United States, there is a statutory
requirement to declare research with a dual-use risk but this
requires that the risk has been identified; plant researchers may
not consider that their research outcome could have a dual use. It
is therefore important to consider the possibility of dual use
during a risk assessment, to liaise with the appropriate competent
authorities and to instigate proportionate containment and
security measures to guard against misappropriation.
Containment methods for GM plant viruses
As part of this review, we contacted 35 research groups in 18
countries working with infectious clones of plant viruses,
requesting risk assessments, standard operating procedures and
details of any permits or licences required by their competent
authorities to work with ICs.
Most respondents were United Kingdom or United States
based and designated their plant virus IC work as requiring BSL2
and therefore subject to the requirements laid out in Table 1.
However, specific containment measures are based on the risk
assessment and depend on the nature of the plant virus and the
way in which it is being used. The following section therefore
details aspects of facility design, equipment and operating
procedures specifically tailored to containment of plant virus
infectious clones. Examples are drawn from the published
literature and information provided by scientists working with
plant virus ICs. As many plant viruses have arthropod vectors,
strategies are needed not only for containment of infected plant
material but also any vectors (Hogenhout et al., 2008). More
generic guidance on commissioning and building plant quaran-
tine facilities and developing standard operating procedures is
available from national competent authorities such as the HSE
(UK), the NIH (USA), the Canadian Food Inspection Agency and
Adair and Irwin (2008).
Biological containment methods
Biological containment involves taking steps to render contained
organisms biologically incapacitated, and in the context of plant
virus infectious clones, this can be achieved in a variety of ways
and at a number of stages in the IC construction, modification
and inoculation process.
In most cases, plant virus genomes are maintained and
propagated in the laboratory within disarmed Escherichia coli
strains such as DH5a, which are not pathogenic to humans,
animals or plants. In addition, eukaryotic promoters are used to
reduce the likelihood of the viral genome being transcribed within
the prokaryotic bacterial host. This means that minimal physical
and chemical containment methods are then required for these
bacterial cultures. Similarly, thought should be given to the
temporal order of plasmid construction, for example adding the
promoter sequence last to delay the point in the development
pipeline at which the clone becomes infectious.
The plasmid containing the viral genome is then often
transformed into disarmed strains of A. tumefaciens such as
C58C1 (pMP90) from which the tumour inducing genes have
been removed (Wagner et al., 2004). However, these strains of
A. tumefaciens are infectious to plants, and when containing
plasmids with genetically modified viral genome sequences, they
must be handled accordingly.
When using plant virus ICs as expression vectors, as is the case
for molecular farming, the viral genome itself may be modified to
be less virulent or transmissible (HSE, 2004; Plchova et al., 2017).
There are many examples of so-called deconstructed vector
systems, in which a part of the viral genome required for systemic
spread is removed and delegated instead to a transgenic host
plant (Gleba et al., 2007). For example, deletion of the Potato
virus X movement protein prevents systemic spread of PVX except
in transgenic plants expressing the movement protein (Manske
and Schiemann, 2005).
This approach is less useful for studying the nature of plant
viruses and their interaction with their hosts, or for germplasm
screening, where fully infectious clones are desirable as a source
of viral inoculum rather than as a biotechnology tool. For viruses
with segmented genomes, some degree of biological contain-
ment prior to inoculation may still be achieved by maintaining
different parts of the viral genome within different cDNA clones.
The host plant then needs to be co-inoculated with different
clones to enable complete infectious virus particles to be created,
as demonstrated for the tripartite Barley stripe mosaic virus
(BSMV) genome (Lee et al., 2012). Separating viral genome
components in this way reduces the risk of accidentally releasing
the entire viral genome prior to inoculation, but does not reduce
the risk posed by the full virus once reconstructed in planta.
Biological containment may also be used to prevent or limit the
transmission of IC-derived plant viruses by insect or arthropod
vectors. For example, the viral genome may be modified to
remove the genes required for transmission, as shown for
Tobacco rattle tobravirus transmission by nematode vectors
(Hernandez et al., 1997). However, this requires knowledge of
the genetic components required for vector transmission, which is
lacking for most plant viruses. In addition, limiting vector
transmission in this way precludes the study of vector transmis-
sion itself.
In practice, a more broadly applicable biological method of
preventing vector transmission is to conduct experiments, partic-
ularly those using vectors, at a time of year when they would not
be able to establish outside of the containment facility. Similarly,
experiments can be conducted at a time of year when the host
plant is not being widely grown. Another approach used for
pollen- and seed-transmitted viruses is to prevent flowering or
remove flowering plant parts to prevent pollen and seed
transmission (Adair and Irwin, 2008; Department of Agriculture,
South Africa, 2004).
Facility design
Many of the facility considerations for containment of plant
viruses are addressed by generic guidance for plant quarantine
buildings (see Adair and Irwin, 2008) and subject to the
requirements for the designated biosafety level as summarized
in Table 1 However, some aspects of facility design are
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particularly relevant to plant virus containment, as laid out below
and in Figure 1. Note that requirements for each aspect of facility
design are dependent on risk assessment; not all facility design
measures will be required for every IC use.
Location and surroundings
Geographical isolation from potential hosts is a useful tool for the
containment of many plants and plant-associated microorgan-
isms. In the case of GM crop plants, pollen dispersal distances are
often used in risk assessments, particularly for confined field trials
where there is limited physical containment. Risk of introgression
can be considered low when there are no crops or cross-
pollinating wild relatives within the dispersal distance.
Pollen dispersal distances may also be useful for assessing the
risk of escape and establishment of pollen-transmitted viruses
and setting physical, biological and/or chemical containment
requirements accordingly. The same applies to identifying the
maximum travel distances of insect vectors in the case of vector-
transmitted viruses. In some cases, it may be permissible to relax
physical and other containment measures due to geographical
isolation.
Laying out the ground immediately surrounding the facility
with concrete allows rapid identification and removal of any
germinating plants that could act as hosts for contained viruses or
virus vectors. This measure may also be useful in the case of seed-
transmitted viruses when the research has involved collection of
virus-infected seed which could germinate and disseminate the
virus if released. However, it should be noted that the primary
route of seed escape would be on researchers’ clothing and that
seeds might not be shed immediately.
Entrances, exits and vestibules
Air lock entrances with interlocking doors are useful not only for
controlling access to the facility via key cards, but also serve as an
additional control for highly mobile insect vectors. The vestibule
at the entrance to a growth room can be enhanced to prevent
vector entry or escape by the use of high temperatures, or
controlled lighting so that the vestibule is always darker than the
containment room thus discouraging insect egress due to light
attraction. Additionally, air lock compartments with powerful air
showers can be used to ensure the removal of any insects from
clothing and equipment at entry and exit. The United States
Department of Agriculture Animal and Plant Inspectorate Service
(USDA-APHIS) recommend full wet showers on exit when
working with quarantine insect vectors (USDA-APHIS 2010).
Air handling
Many plant growth facilities rely on air conditioning and air
circulation systems to maintain appropriate temperature,
humidity and CO2 levels. Depending on the nature of the
virus and the work conducted, suitable filters may be required
to trap any potentially infected particulate matter, such as
pollen, petals and insects. While HEPA filters are a requirement
at BSL3, Phillipson and Weekes (2005) observe that they are
unlikely to be necessary for most plant virus work. However,
this does not consider the requirements of multipurpose
facilities housing various quarantine organisms with diverse
containment requirements.
USDA-APHIS (2010) suggests the use of 80 mesh for working
with plant viruses and their vectors. They also suggest directional
airflow with movement from the least to most hazardous rooms
within a facility.
As previously mentioned, maintenance of negative air pressure
compared to the surrounding environment may be unnecessary
or even detrimental to the containment of plant viruses and their
vectors. However, it may be required for other organisms within
the facility. In this case, influx air should be filtered to prevent the
ingress of insect vectors due to negative pressure. Air treatment
systems should also be designed to accommodate access for
repair and routine maintenance without compromising contain-
ment.
Equipment
Autoclaves
Autoclaves for inactivation of solid waste are required within the
building at BSL2 and within the facility at BSL3. At the two BSL3
plant virus containment facilities we surveyed (UK and Poland),
double doored ‘through the wall’ autoclaves are installed to
prevent material becoming contaminated after autoclaving but
before removal from the facility, exceeding general requirements
for this BSL.
As with all decontamination measures, it is important to
validate the effectiveness of autoclave run settings (i.e. temper-
ature and run duration) for inactivation of viruses. Temperature
indicator strips and electronic monitoring should be used to
confirm the correct function of autoclaves.
Wastewater treatment
Depending on the risk assessment, it may be necessary to collect
and treat some or all wastewater in a facility, such as run-off from
plant watering, washing up basins, hand-wash sinks and show-
ers. Purpose built wastewater treatment units may be used
combining chemical, thermal and UV treatment. However, in
some cases, dilution alone may serve to render plant viruses
noninfectious. For example, >1/512 dilution of Barley stripe
mosaic virus inoculum abolishes infectivity of this virus (Urban
et al., 2011). Screens or filter socks over drains may be used to
collect solid material such as plant waste from run-off water,
which can then be autoclaved (Adair and Irwin, 2008). As many
facilities house multiple organisms requiring containment, treat-
ment of common aspects such as water must be validated for all
contained organisms, not just viruses (Urban et al., 2011).
Data collection equipment
Removal of potentially contaminated data collection equipment
from containment facilities poses a significant risk of accidental
release of plant viruses. The installation of networked computers
with associated hardware such as scanners, printers and memory
card readers within the facility negates the need to remove
laboratory notebooks and cameras, as data can be uploaded to
shared drives from within the facility.
Other facility considerations
It is advisable to use a Class II laminar flow biosafety cabinet for
opening packages received from elsewhere, as imported plant
material may house other pathogens besides the desired virus
strain (USDA-APHIS 2010). As with any containment facility, there
should be an alarm system to detect the failure of critical systems
such as loss of negative pressure, as well as alarmed emergency
exits. Facilities and equipment should be regularly checked and
routinely serviced. Where downstream analysis of infected plant
tissue is required, such as molecular characterization or micro-
scopy, there should be provisions for this within the containment
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Figure 1 Representative schematic of a containment facility for research involving plant virus infectious clones. Note that specific requirements are
determined by individual risk assessments; not every measure will be required or appropriate for a specific virus or use.
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facility or in another facility running at the same BSL, with transfer
in sealed nonbreakable containers. If this is not possible material,
should be inactivated before removal from the facility, for
example by harvesting into biocidal lysis buffer.
Standard operating procedures (SOPs)
Containment of plant viruses relies not only on adequate facilities
but also strict adherence to standard operating procedures (SOPs)
for facility operations and experiments, designed to ensure both
personnel safety and effective containment. As with facilities and
equipment, these should be based on a risk assessment and
tailored to the work being done, avoiding unnecessary blanket
measures and ensuring that all requirements are achievable.
Personal protective wear
Personal protective wear refers to garments worn by researchers
and facilities staff to protect them from biological or chemical
hazards. However, in the case of plant virus containment, such
items also reduce the risk of infectious material leaving the facility
on clothing, skin or hair.
Microbiological laboratory coats are required as standard in
plant containment facilities, and should ideally be kept within the
facility and decontaminated prior to removal, or else transported
within sealed containers, as contaminated laboratory coats are an
obvious source of accidental virus release. For facilities housing
growth rooms running at different BSLs, it is advisable to have
different coloured laboratory coats associated with each level.
Additional laboratory coats or disposable boiler suits should be
provided to engineers, depending on the nature of work to be
done.
Gloves are required at BSL3 and are subject to risk assessment
for BSL2. While gloves may aid in preventing virus spread, it is
important to consider when they should be changed or removed
to prevent contamination of communal surfaces, such as door
handles and computer keyboards. This is particularly relevant to
mechanically transmitted viruses which could be transferred to
noninfected plants via contaminated surfaces.
As previously described, prevention of flowering or removal of
flowering plants is often used as a biological containment
measure. However, where experiments require flowering plants
infected with viruses transmitted via pollen, and risk assessment
dictates that this must be contained, hairnets may be worn to
reduce the risk of pollen spread. These are removed and disposed
of prior to exiting the containment facility.
While many plant containment facilities use chemical foot
baths to decontaminate shoes on exit, an alternative is to use
disposable overshoes.
Waste and equipment decontamination
The most common means of inactivating biological material is by
autoclaving (see previous section under ‘Equipment’). However, if
waste or equipment needs to be transported within or between
facilities prior to autoclaving, additional steps should be taken to
inactivate or contain it. For example, glassware may be soaked in
disinfectant prior to removal for autoclaving. Any such protocol
must be validated for successful inactivation of the target virus,
rather than simply following generic protocols or manufacturers’
instructions.
Chemical decontamination methods should be validated for
equipment that cannot be autoclaved, such as plastic plant pots
and trays. These methods may need to be effective both against
viruses and against insect vectors (see ‘Vector Control’ below). If
this cannot be achieved, it may be advisable to use single-use
equipment.
Limits are routinely set on maximum viral inoculum volumes
(e.g. <100 mL) to ensure effective disinfection of liquid waste and
containment of spills, and to reduce the likelihood of infective
doses being present in wastewater, negating the need for
wastewater treatment.
As previously outlined under ‘Equipment’, decontamination of
run-off water is dependent on risk assessment and not always
required. In facilities without sealed floors (i.e. BSL2 glasshouses),
run-off should be minimized and the ground treated periodically
to inactivate virus particles.
Surface sterilization
As with waste disposal, surface sterilization products and
methods and should be validated for activity against the target
organism, for example by swabbing benches after sterilization
and inoculating test plants. Protocols for hand washing also need
to be appropriate for the viral system being used rather than
simply the BSL. For example, quarantine procedures for TMV at
Purdue University (USA) specify the use of cows’ milk to wash
hands in, particularly for smokers, to inactivate TMV and prevent
mechanical transmission. They note that 70% ethanol is not
effective (Adair and Irwin, 2008).
In addition, care should be taken to ensure that equipment
used throughout a facility, such as watering cans, do not become
contaminated, as this could result in accidental transfer of
mechanically transmitted viruses between plants during watering.
Any such equipment that comes into contact with infected plant
material should be decontaminated prior to further use.
Vector control
Control of disease vectors within research facilities is a general
requirement laid out by regulators in many countries including
the United Kingdom and United States. This is particularly
pertinent to containment of plant viruses with known or potential
native insect vectors. However, such control may be achieved in
several different ways.
Many facilities opt for routine and reactive chemical treat-
ments, monitoring for the presence of insect vectors using yellow
sticky traps. Good housekeeping and removal of discarded plants
and dead leaves are also recommended. Where insects are
already present, Adair and Irwin (2008) suggest ‘baking out’
growth rooms at 40 °C for 2–3 days between experiments to kill
insects, but advise consideration of whether this will damage
equipment. This is also not appropriate for facilities with
continuously running experiments.
Alternatively, freezing compost for 48 h at 20 °C prior to use
has been found to be effective for excluding arthropod pests from
the facility when used in combination with airlock entry and exits,
heat trap vestibules and air showers.
The protocols of many BSL2+ facilities also preclude the
movement of plants between facilities and the quarantining of
any plants coming in from facilities running at a lower BSL. This is
because contaminated plants may introduce both insect vectors
and wild-type viruses along with other pathogens that could
confound study results. Similarly, where seed-borne viruses are of
concern, the movement of seed may be controlled and only
confirmed virus-free seed used.
Finally, restrictions on personnel movement can help to prevent
introduction of vectors. For example, some SOPs state that
researchers should not enter plant containment facilities after
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visiting insectaries or field sites, or participating in recreational
activities outdoors.
Monitoring and training
High-specification containment facilities and stringent operating
procedures mean nothing in the absence of staff compliance.
Staff therefore need to be adequately trained in all relevant
protocols and understand the rationale behind them. The
principal investigator or facilities manager should oversee and
assess training and monitor compliance. Many institutes review
and update their SOPs annually, and all staff should be involved in
this process and kept abreast of any changes.
Regulation of research involving plant virus ICs
In many countries, plant virus ICs and other plant pathogens
require regulation both as genetically modified organisms and as
disease-causing agents, with approval for their use granted by at
least one national competent authority and subject to multiple
laws regarding both human health and the environment.
Contained use activities may also be regulated at both the
national and local level. Researchers must therefore ensure that
their activities conform to all relevant regulations and that
approval has been sought from all competent authorities. Here,
we illustrate the complexity of the regulatory and approval
process faced by plant virus researchers, focusing on the UK
framework with comparisons made to other countries.
Laws governing contained use of plant virus ICs
In the United Kingdom, the Genetically Modified Organisms
(Contained Use) Regulations (HSE 2014) set out the requirement
for containmentmeasureswhenworkingwith geneticallymodified
microorganisms (GMMs) in order to limit risks to both human
health and the environment. In addition, the Environmental
Protection Act (EPA 1990) sets out the requirement for appropriate
measures to “avoid damage to the environment that may arise
from escape or release from human control” of GMMs. The UK
regulatory framework for the contained use of plant virus ICs as
GMMs is therefore guided by these two pieces of legislation.
Competent authorities overseeing plant virus research
Contained use of GM plant viruses in the United Kingdom is
overseen by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) working with
the Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
(Defra) in England and Wales, and Science and Advice for Scottish
Agriculture (SASA) in Scotland, with equivalent legislation and
oversight in Northern Ireland by the Health and Safety Executive
Northern Ireland (HSE-NI) and the Department for Agriculture,
Environment and Rural Affairs (DAERA).
There is a requirement tonotifyHSE (UK) of all intendedcontained
uses of GMMs. Two separate notifications are required; firstly of the
premises tobeused (for all BSLs) and secondlyof individual contained
uses (BSL2-4). Contained use at BSL3/4 requires consent from the
competent authority, rather than simply notification.
Regulation of plant pathogens
In addition to being GMMs, plant virus ICs may also be subject to
additional regulation as plant pathogens. Many countries set and
enforce prohibitions on the import, movement and keeping of
certain plants and plant pathogens. Such prohibitions generally
apply to nonindigenous strains, those subject to an eradication
campaign, or those that exhibit increased risks to plant health due
to increased pathogenicity, host range or survival. In the United
Kingdom, researchers must apply to APHA (an agency of Defra)
for a licence to work with prohibited plant viruses, in addition to
the previously outlined GM notification to HSE. Detailed descrip-
tions of containment procedures and facilities are required as part
of the licence application, and effective containment and
destruction of the prohibited virus are a condition of licence
approval. Equivalent systems exist in other countries including the
United States, Australia and Canada, where prohibited pathogens
require a permit for contained use and are therefore referred to
as ‘permitted pathogens’ (Australian Government, 2017; CFIA,
2017; USDA-APHIS, 2016). In all cases, provision of a licence or
permit requires inspection and approval of the research estab-
lishment by a local and/or national competent authority, which
may be distinct from the competent authority overseeing
approval for GM work. For example, in Australia, import of plant
pests requires approval by the Department of Agriculture and
Water Resources, while accreditation of facilities conducting
research with GMOs falls to the Office of the Gene Technology
Regulator (http://www.ogtr.gov.au/).
Barriers to meeting plant virus containment
requirements
While the guidance set out within this review is theoretically
achievable, in some cases barriers to containment of plant virus
infectious clones remain.
For example, specifications for facility design assume the
reliable supply of utilities such as electricity and water to ensure
continuous operation of control systems, supplemental lighting
and air conditioning. Such provisions are taken for granted in
many countries but may be harder to achieve in countries or
regions where utility supplies are unreliable.
Expertise in specific viruses may be primarily in institutes where
the host plant is widely researched and grown extensively, thus
presenting an increased risk of virus spread within and between
growth facilities. Geographical isolation may also not be feasible
due to the presence of field trials and commercial plantings in
proximity to the containment facility. This is less of an issue for
unmodified endemic virus clones, but may increase the risk posed
by modifications that alter virus pathogenicity or transmission, or
research into exotic viruses of native crops. Biological control
methods such as conducting experiments at a time of year when
the host and/or vector is absent from the environment along with
stringent physical and chemical containment measures may
therefore be required.
Barriers to capacity and location may be overcome by
international collaborations that facilitate the use of plant virus
infectious clones in counties or areas where the plant host and
vector are absent. Such examples include the use of infectious
clones of Cassava mosaic virus in the United States to screen
cassava germplasm for resistance prior to conducting field trials in
East Africa (Beyene et al., 2016; Kuria et al., 2017). This virus is a
major threat to cassava production in sub-Saharan Africa but
poses little appreciable risk in the United States where cassava is
not cultivated. However, the possibility of host species jumps or
unidentified insect vectors should always be considered and
appropriate containment measures applied.
The main barrier to successful containment is arguably that
posed by human error or failure to comply with SOPs, as
demonstrated by containment breaches involving human patho-
gens (Sample, 2014; Weiss et al., 2015). Diligent oversight of
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staff training, competence and compliance is therefore key to
successful plant virus containment. It is also important that all
staff understand the rationale for containment measures and the
risks associated with a failure in plant virus containment.
Conclusion
Plant virus ICs are important molecular tools in many areas of
biology. However, their status as both GMMs and plant
pathogens necessitates their containment by a combination of
biological, physical and operational measures to prevent harm to
the environment and allay concerns regarding perceived or
potential risks to human health. This review is the first to bring
together biosafety and regulatory considerations from multiple
international sources for working with plant viruses and is
therefore a valuable resource for all researchers developing
projects involving the use of plant viruses in a range of
biotechnology fields.
The appropriate containment strategies for plant virus ICs
should be decided based on case by case assessment of the risks
posed and the measures needed to mitigate them, rather than
assuming that generic containment measures informed by a given
BSL will be sufficient. Similarly, all containment methods required
should be validated for the IC and operational system in question,
rather than assuming their efficacy. Adequate staff training and
monitoring of compliance are also essential for effective contain-
ment.
Further research on the persistence of inserted DNA constructs
along with the relative fitness of modified clones compared to
wild-type viruses would be helpful in aiding the risk assessment
process and ensuring that appropriate containment measures are
in place. This may vary depending on the virus or modification in
question and would require research on a case by case basis.
The notification or approval process for use of plant virus ICs
may require two or more applications to various competent
authorities to comply with separate regulations governing the use
of firstly, GMMs and secondly, plant pathogens, in addition to
being regulated at both local and national/state levels. A more
streamlined regulatory framework that addresses this dual nature
of plant virus ICs and other plant pathogens may save duplication
during the application process, both in the United Kingdom and
elsewhere.
The generation and use of plant virus infectious clones are no
longer the preserve of the plant molecular biologist, having
rapidly gained traction in other fields, particularly biomedicine. It
is therefore increasingly important that the growing body of
researchers using these valuable tools are aware of the potential
risks they pose and how to mitigate against them.
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